A TRENDING USE OF INSULATION AND
A TEMPORARY WAY OUT
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I. Introduction
In 2010, Associate Justice Stephen Breyer warned the majority of the
United States Supreme Court of the consequences facing their decision in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.1 In this
decision, the Court held that after losing in administrative court, defendants may
challenge the constitutionality of the administrative process before a federal court.
In other words, defendants may challenge the constitutionality of the hiring
process of administrative law judges (“ALJs”), enabling defendants to undermine
the administrative process by attacking the method of hiring the ALJs who
rendered the unfavorable decisions against such defendants.2 A recent trend of
this type of litigation has proven Justice Breyer correct. Specifically, defendants
who have been charged by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) for
violating rules and regulations have bought themselves extra time by filing
pretextual federal-question claims in federal courts to directly challenge whether
or not the hiring of SEC ALJs violates Article II of the Constitution.3 This tactic,
used by defense counsel to delay and derail their clients’ cases, has been relatively
successful in a few jurisdictions thus far, even though the President has not
invoked his Article II powers to challenge the ALJ hiring process.4
There is an overriding interest to abide by Congress’s decision that
defendants go through the entire administrative review process prior to
challenging such process. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) was created
in 19465 to “establish[] the fundamental relationship between regulatory agencies
and those whom they regulate[,]” which essentially “permitted the growth of the
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1. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
2. See id. at 543 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Does every losing party before an ALJ now have grounds to appeal on the
basis that the decision entered against him is unconstitutional?”).
3. Article II of the United States Constitution confers powers to the executive branch. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1
(“The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”); see, e.g., Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v.
SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 2015); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015); Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85015 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
4. See Jerome Nelson, Administrative Law Judges’ Removal “Only For Cause”: Is That Administrative Procedure
Act Protection Now Unconstitutional?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 409 (2011) (“[P]residents rarely test the removal provision.”).
5. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 551
(1994)).
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modern regulatory state”6 as it exists today. Tom Clark, the Attorney General
appointed by President Harry Truman (and who later became an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court),7 explained that one of the fundamental purposes of the
APA is “[t]o prescribe uniform standards for the conduct of formal rule making”
and “[t]o restate the law of judicial review.”8 According to Clark’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act, claims may “be subject to judicial review” so long
as the relevant statute permits review of agency action or so long as the agency
action is considered “final”.9 Since inception, the intent of the APA has been to
allow Article III courts to review agency actions after the agency makes a final
decision.10 If courts continue to allow defendants to derail adverse administrative
proceedings without exhausting administrative remedies first, others in similar
predicaments will follow the trend, rending the APA’s purpose futile.11 Even if
SEC defendants are entitled to judicial review of this constitutional question prior
to final agency order, the argument that ALJs are improperly appointed is flawed
and has no merit because SEC ALJs are not under the purview of Article II’s
Appointment Clause.
Sufficient precedence holds that “when a statute is unclear, the resulting
discretion belongs generally to the agency charged with its administration”
because the agency has the “expertise and political sensitivity [which the] courts
lack.”12 The Supreme Court has previously stated “neither this Court nor Congress
has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the
federal law . . . to be tried in an Article III court before a judge enjoying lifetime
tenure and protection against salary reduction.”13 Here, through the observation
of the history and the language of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”)14 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,15 there is sufficient clarity to demonstrate that following
two of the most major economic downfalls of our time, Congress intended to give
the SEC broad powers to stringently regulate securities in order to prevent similar
future catastrophes.16 When Congress “explicitly [leaves] a gap for the agency to
6. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics ,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558–59 (1996).
7. Associate Justice Tom C. Clark served on the United States Supreme Court from 1949 to 1967. See Tom C. Clark,
Former Justice, Dies; On the Supreme Court for 18 Years, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 1977),

http://www.nytimes.com/1977/06/14/archives/tom-c-clark-former-justice-dies-on-the-supreme-court-for-18-years.html.
8. TOM C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947), available at

http://archive.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/attorneygeneralsmanual.pdf.
9. Id. at 120, § 10(c) (“Judicial Review”).
10. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1966) (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”); see also FTC v.
Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244–47 (1980) (holding that defendant company was not entitled to judicial review before
the conclusion of the FTC’s administrative adjudication against it).
11. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 216 (1994) (holding that the language and structure of
the Mine Act does not demonstrate “that Congress intended to allow mine operators to evade the statutory-review process”);
Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 775 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Every person hoping to enjoin an ongoing administrative proceeding could
make this argument, yet courts consistently require plaintiffs to use the administrative review schemes established by
Congress.”); Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“This Court’s jurisdiction is not an escape hatch for
litigants to delay or derail an administrative action when statutory channels of review are entirely adequate.”).
12. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66
(2009); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that if a statute expresses a clear intent
from Congress, then courts must defer to this intent when interpreting the statute, but if it is unclear, the court must
construe the agency’s interpretation “based on a permissible construction of the statute”).
13. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 408 (1973).
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301, et. seq. (2010).
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
16. See 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (stating that the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is “[t]o promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the
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fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to” fill that particular
gap.17 In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress explicitly delegated its prosecutorial
authority to the SEC because it purposely left a gap in the Act for the SEC to fill
when determining the “other purposes” for which the Dodd-Frank Act could be
used.18 If more courts allow SEC defendants to derail their cases in this pretextual
manner, the intent of Congress to effectively and efficiently prosecute securitieslaw violators will be moot. The administrative proceedings against such
defendants will be further disrupted, delayed, and undermined while the
defendants are able to circumvent liability for the fraudulent schemes in which
they participated. This type of circumvention is precisely what Congress intented
to prevent in its enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Moreover, it is ultimately up
to the legislature, and not the courts, to change the administrative adjudicatory
process.
In order to understand the constitutionality of the SEC’s administrative
process, Part II of this Article begins with a history of Article II’s Appointments
Clause. Part III describes the competing theories resulting from a circuit split,
specifically Hill v. Securities & Exchange Commission19 and Bebo v. Securities
Exchange Commission.20 Part IV of this Article then evaluates the impact of the
Appointments Clause on the Dodd-Frank Act and discusses the consequences of
raising meritless constitutional questions that jeopardize the intent of the DoddFrank Act. Subsection IV.A. explains the exhaustion doctrine and subsection IV.B.
explores Congress’s intent of implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the
SEC’s review. Subsection IV.C. analyzes why SEC ALJs are not considered
“Inferior Officers” in the context of Article II. Subsection IV.D. examines subject
matter jurisdiction of federal courts over these constitutional questions.
Subsection IV.E. confirms that the SEC is an independent agency. Part V
discusses the implications of SEC-based litigation in the future. Part VI concludes
that the SEC’s administrative process is constitutional.
II. History of the Appointments Clause
As we see in modern times, former President Barack Obama’s ability to
appoint a Supreme Court Justice to fill the late Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat
became a hotly contested issue by Republican Senators who adamantly opposed
and doubted Obama’s constitutional power to appoint a Supreme Court Justice
during his “lame-duck” session of Congress.21 Article II, section 2 of the United
States Constitution states the following powers of the President and Congress:
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes”) (emphasis added); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78b (stating one of the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act is “to
impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective” since the securities
markets affect “a national public interest”) (emphasis added); see infra note 107 and accompanying text for information
about the Great Recession and the Great Depression.
17. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
18. See 12 U.S.C. § 5301.
19. 114 F. Supp.3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
20. 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015).
21. See Jeff Mason & Richard Cowan, Obama Weighs Republican for Supreme Court, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2016, 7:50
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-idUSKCN0VX1LL; Burgess Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws
Down the Gauntlet: No Scalia Replacement Under Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016, 6:34 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/mitch-mcconnell-antonin-scalia-supreme-court-nomination-219248;
Brian
Rosenwald, It’s Not Too Late for Obama to Pick a New Justice , CNN (Feb. 15, 2016, 6:18 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/15/opinions/power-to-choose-new-justice-rosenwald/.
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[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
Inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.22

In comparison to other constitutional provisions, Article II is hardly disputed. The
President can appoint ambassadors, Supreme Court Justices and other United
States “Principal Officers” with the advice and consent of the Senate.23 On the
other hand, Congress can vest its appointment powers in the President, Courts of
Law, or Heads of Departments to appoint “Inferior Officers.”24 In the rare cases
that this provision is actually disputed, the issue usually revolves around the
meaning of “Officer” and the President’s ability to appoint.
Since the Framers did not explicitly define “Inferior Officer”, courts have
approached this issue by observing various factors of the chosen official’s position
“on a case-by-case basis rather than through a definitive test.”25 Generally, any
appointee who is not labeled a Principal Officer is by default an Inferior Officer.
Congress must then decide if the Appointment Power of such Inferior Officer
should be vested in the executive branch or the judicial branch.26 For the most
part, a “President’s right . . . to appoint an officer hinges on whether the
appointment is important enough to be considered a ‘[P]rincipal [O]fficer’
position.”27 In essence, if the appointee is not a Principal Officer who has a
sufficiently “important” position, Congress can vest the power to appoint such
Inferior Officers in any of the President, Courts of Law, or Heads of Department.28
However, a conclusory definition as to what an “Officer” is and what is considered
an “important” duty is still ambiguous because there are few cases that articulate
a principle.29
Myers v. United States is one of the earliest cases that analyzes the removal
powers of the President.30 Here, the Supreme Court recognizes Article II vests
executive power in the President for the purpose of granting him “the power of
appointment and removal of executive officers”31 because “[t]he power of removal
is incident to the power of appointment.”32 Consequently, the Court holds that the
unrestricted power of Congress to remove Officers is invalid because it takes away
the exclusive power of the President to remove executive branch officials.33

22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Douglas
Cox,
Inferior
Officers,
THE
HERITAGE
FOUND.,
http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/2/essays/92/inferior-officers (last visited Jan. 13, 2016, 11:47 A.M.); see,
e.g., Edward Susolik, Separation of Powers and Liberty: The Appointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1545 (1990) (explaining that in Morrison, the Supreme Court considered “whether Morrison’s duties
and functions were important enough to characterize her as a principal officer, or whether the temporary and narrow nature
of her position made her an ‘Inferior Officer’ (or even an ‘employee’)”).
26. Susolik, supra note 25, at 1546.
27. Id. at 1539.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1545.
30. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
31. Id. at 115.
32. Id. at 122.
33. See id. at 176.
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Ultimately, it is the president who has the power to appoint and remove Officers
of the executive branch.
In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,34 the Court adds another factor
for removal. The President’s power to remove an officer “will depend upon the
character of the office.”35 This case dealt with the character and nature of the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). Because the FTC is considered a “quasijudicial” and “quasi-legislative” agency, the Court determines it “must be free from
executive control” as contemplated by the Federal Trade Commission Act. 36 In
other words, when Congress uses its authority to create an independent “quasilegislative” or “quasi-judicial” agency, executive power and control are meant to
be kept sufficiently out of reach.37 Therefore, the Act essentially limits the removal
powers of the President in these types of quasi-agencies to situations where there
is “just cause” for firing, such as for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office.”38 Thus, although the President has the power to appoint the FTC
Commissioner,39 Congress still limits the President’s removal powers depending
on the nature of the office.
Yet, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court states that the Appointments
Clause may “control[] the appointment of . . . typical administrative agency
[members] even though its functions . . . may be ‘predominantly quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative’ rather than executive.”40 Further complicating the analysis, even
if the agency is intended to be “independent of the Executive in [its] day-to-day
operations, the Executive [is] not excluded from selecting [members],”41 despite
the “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative” nature of the office.
Buckley also adds more factors to the President’s removal authority while
reaffirming the principle that only the President is allowed to select Principal
Officers with the advice and consent of the Senate, while Congress may allow the
President, Heads of Departments, or the Judiciary to appoint Inferior Officers. 42
Here, an Officer is one who may exercise “significant authority”.43 Because
“Officers of the United States” were “defined to include ‘all persons who can be
said to hold an office under the government,’”44 the members of the Federal
Election Commission in this case were considered “at the very least . . . ‘Inferior
Officers’ within the meaning of [the Appointments] Clause” and not employees of
the United States.45 “Employees [are believed to be] lesser functionaries
subordinate to officers of the United States, whereas the Commissioners,
appointed for a statutory term, are not subject to the control or direction of any
other executive, judicial, or legislative authority.”46
To determine whether the appointment of the Federal Election Commission
members is valid, the Court focuses on the Commission’s enforcement powers,
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

295 U.S. 602 (1935).
See id. at 631.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 623, 626.
Id. at 619–20.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133 (1976).

Id.
Id. at 132.
See id. at 126.
Id.
Id., 126 n.162.
Id. at 126, 126 n.162.
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which generally include the Commission’s task of developing the statute by way
of “rulemaking and advisory opinions, [as well as] functions necessary to ensure
compliance with the statute and rules—informal procedures, administrative
determinations and hearings, and civil suits.”47 Because these functions “may be
discharged only by persons who are ‘Officers[,]’” the “provisions of the [Federal
Election Campaign] Act, vesting in the Commission primary responsibility for
conducting civil litigation, violate [Article II].”48 Again, the Court sustained the
principle “that an [O]fficer is ‘any appointee exercising significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States.’”49 Three factors that appear to be
considered here in the Court’s determination of significance are the appointee’s
“level of responsibility or power”, the appointee’s tenure, and the impermanent
“nature of the office.”50
In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 allows the Chief
Judge of the Tax Court to appoint special trial judges (“STJs”) to hear certain
proceedings designated by the Chief Judge.51 It was determined that STJs were
“Inferior Officers” because although they were not allowed to enter final case
decisions,52 they played a vital role beyond ministerial tasks in assisting the Chief
Judge, including responsibilities such as the ability to “take testimony, conduct
trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and . . . enforce compliance with
discovery orders.”53 In sum, STJs were given significant discretion in aiding the
Chief Judge’s decision with respect to formulating outcomes of cases. However,
since the Tax Court is determined to be a “‘Court of Law’ within the meaning of
the Appointments Clause,” the Chief Judge was well within his authority to
appoint STJs.54 The Supreme Court concludes that the Tax Court was in fact an
Article I court because the nature of the court is “judicial, rather than executive,
legislative, or administrative.”55 The Tax Court also remains wholly independent
of the other branches of government and it does not make rules or political
decisions.56
Finally, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court determines that the
creation of the Public Company Oversight Board (the “Board”) is unconstitutional
because the Board members are considered “Inferior Officers” exercising
significant authority.57 Thus, a president cannot be insulated from removing
them.58 For example, the Board’s significant authority includes the ability to:
promulgate[] auditing and ethics standards, perform[] routine inspections of all
accounting firms, demand[] documents and testimony, and initiate[] formal
investigations and disciplinary proceedings. The willful violation of any Board rule
is treated as a wilful violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 – a federal
crime punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment of $25 million in fines . . . . And
the Board itself can issue severe sanctions in its disciplinary proceedings, up to
47. Id. at 137.
48. Id. at 140.
49. Susolik, supra note 25.
50. Id. at 1546 (explaining the last factor, “[t]he more temporary the nature of the office, the less likely that the
appointee will be considered an officer”).
51. See 501 U.S. 868, 870–71 (1991).
52. Id. at 874.
53. Id. at 881–82 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 890–93.
55. Id. at 890–91.
56. See id.
57. See 561 U.S. 477, 485–86 (2010).
58. See id. at 492.
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and including the permanent revocation of a firm’s registration, a permanent ban
on a person’s associating with any registered firm, and money penalties of $15
million . . . . [T]he Board is “part of the Government” for constitutional purposes,
and . . . its members are “‘Officers of the United States’” who “exercis[e] significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States. 59

In total, Board members have significant authority because they can directly
punish rule violators and order sanctions. Furthermore, provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act prevents the President from appointing or removing Board
members.60 Even though properly appointed by the SEC Commissioner, who is the
“Head of Department,” individual Board members are “substantially insulated
from the [SEC’s] control” because the SEC is only allowed to remove the Board
members for “good cause,” which in effect, indirectly insulates the President’s
ability to remove these individual Board members, since the President appoints
the SEC Commissioner.61 Because an SEC Commissioner is appointed and could
be removed by the President, this “multilevel protection from removal” is
determined as “contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the
President”62 since it does not allow the President to “ensure the faithful execution
of the laws.”63 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made a special note that this
holding does not apply to ALJs.64
As a result of these removal cases, an “Officer” is still not clearly defined.
Nonetheless, what is known so far is that a sitting President has the power to
appoint and to remove Principal Officers, but this power may also depend on the
“character of the office.”65 A Principal Officer typically has the ability to exercise
significant authority. Factors determining what is “significant” include the level
of responsibility and power an officer may have, the tenure of the officer’s position,
the impermanent nature of the position, the discretion an officer may exercise in
making a decision,66 the finality of an officer’s decision,67 and the independence of
the agency. Inferior Officers may also be appointed by either the President, Heads
of Department, or Courts of Law, subject to Congress’s decision to vest such
appointment authority.68 Moreover, the President may not be blocked from
removing Inferior Officers as long as restrictions on his removal power does not
impede his ability to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”69
For reasons further noted below, SEC ALJs are neither Principal Officers
nor Inferior Officers because they do not have significant authority. Additionally,
SEC ALJs do not have tenure like an Article III judge, and they do not have final
discretion over their decisions.
Furthermore, the SEC is considered an

59. Id. at 485–86 (internal citations omitted).
60. See id. at 495–96 (noting the provision created a double layer of for-cause removal, which violated the separation
of powers doctrine since it); see generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (providing that the SEC can
only remove Board members “for good cause shown” and not at will).
61. 561 U.S. at 486, 510.
62. Id. at 484.
63. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988)).
64. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
65. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631 (1935).
66. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
67. Id.
68. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
69. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–693 (1988) (holding that as long as removal restrictions do not
interfere with a president’s ability to carry out his executive powers under Article II, the restrictions will be deemed
constitutional).
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independent agency because it performs “quasi-legislative” and quasi-judicial”
functions.
III. A Brief Introduction of the Competing Theories: Hill Versus Bebo
In an attempt to bypass certain stages of the proceeding, SEC defendants
have been frequently raising federal question claims to challenge the
constitutionality of the administrative proceedings against them.70 Defense
attorneys use this strategic trend because they speculate that federal forums, as
opposed to administrative forums, will more likely rule in favor of the defendants.
The primary cases, Hill v. Securities & Exchange Commission71 and Bebo v.
Securities & Exchange Commission,72 present two different outcomes to the same
constitutional argument raised by defense counsel in each case. Hill rules in favor
of the defendant, holding that the hiring of the ALJs violates the Appointments
Clause.73 The court also holds that because the hiring violates the Constitution,
the federal district court of Georgia has jurisdiction over the defendant’s
constitutional claim, and therefore the defendant is allowed to bypass the
requirement of exhausting all administrative remedies.74 However, the Bebo court
reached the opposite conclusion. Congress, in enacting section 78y of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (“section 78y”),75 did not intend for defendants
undergoing administrative proceedings to halt the process by contesting the
constitutionality of the process itself. Subsequently, by allowing defendants to
derail their cases in this manner, it renders the fundamental point of
administrative law futile since other defendants will follow the trend and attempt
to delay their own cases.76
In Hill, defendant Charles Hill challenges the constitutionality of SEC
administrative proceedings, as well as both the appointment and removal
proceedings of SEC ALJs.77 From his perspective, the Appointments Clause of
Article II is violated because as an “Inferior Officer,” an ALJ should be appointed
by the President, Courts of Law, or a Department Head as Article II requires.78
The defendant’s removal argument is based on the fact that the very position of
an ALJ violates the President’s removal powers because ALJs “are protected by
two layers of tenure protection[,]” thereby insulating the President from being able
to remove them for good cause.79 In simpler terms, if ALJs are in fact considered
“Inferior Officers,” then the SEC’s hiring process is unconstitutional because they
are not properly appointed by the SEC Commissioner (“Head of Department”),
Court of Law, or the President. If, however, ALJs are not considered “Inferior
Officers,” then it is clear that the process of hiring ALJs is appropriate. Judge
Leigh Martin May concluded that since “SEC ALJs are Inferior Officers, . . . their
70. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
71. 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
72. 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015).
73. See 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
74. See id. at 1306 (“[T]he Supreme Court held that the text of § 78y . . . ‘does not expressly limit the jurisdiction that
other statutes confer on district courts’” and that “there is no language indicating that the administrative proceeding was
to be an exclusive forum.”).
75. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78y.
76. See Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 775 (7th Cir. 2015).
77. See 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1304–05, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
78. See id. at 1316.
79. Id.
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appointment violates the Appointments Clause,”80 and thus, under the authority
of section 78y,81 the administrative process “‘could foreclose all meaningful judicial
review’ of [Hill’s] constitutional claims.”82
On the other hand, in Bebo, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
defendant Laurie Bebo’s “attempt to skip the administrative” process by
challenging the SEC’s constitutional authority to conduct the proceeding against
her.83 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that it was Congress’s intent to provide this
type of administrative review process pursuant to section 78y so that challengers
would exhaust all administrative remedies first before taking their claims to
federal court.84 This process was considered to have provided meaningful review
since Bebo can always raise her claims in federal court if she does not win “by the
SEC’s final decision.”85 Bebo’s argument that having to exhaust all administrative
remedies costs a substantial amount also holds no weight because “the expense
and disruption of defending oneself in an administrative proceeding does not
automatically entitle a plaintiff to pursue judicial review in the district courts,
even when those costs are ‘substantial.’”86 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit
Court disregarded Bebo’s contention that the SEC ALJs were improperly
insulated from removal by the President87 as the Court lacked the jurisdictional
threshold to hear Bebo’s claim.
Essentially there are two main competing views. On the one hand, SEC
administrative proceedings are unconstitutional because the accused is forced to
go through an unlawful and one-sided process of review that does not provide
meaningful review from improperly appointed ALJs. On the other hand, SEC
administrative proceedings are constitutional because after all the administrative
proceedings have been exhausted as provided for by section 78y, the accused is
still allowed to have his or her claim reviewed by federal courts, thus providing for
meaningful review. The former approach emphatically allows defendants to
purposely delay or derail the SEC’s case against them, while the latter approach
follows the APA’s guidelines as intended by Congress. An analysis of the
exhaustion doctrine, the Dodd-Frank Act, the procedure of hiring ALJs, and the
role ALJs play in the SEC administrative system is necessary to determine which
theory is most likely to hold water.

80. Id. at 1319.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78y.
82. Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010) (emphasis added)).
83. Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2015); see id. at 775 (supporting her claim, Bebo also argued that “the
administrative review scheme established by § 78y is inadequate because, by the time she is able to seek judicial review in
a court of appeals, she will have already been subjected to an unconstitutional proceeding”).
84. See id. at 767; see also FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 245 (1980) (“[T]he [Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 704,] specifically provides that a ‘preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.’”).
85. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767.
86. Id. at 775 (citing Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 244); see also Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 244 (explaining that
even though defendant has to bear substantial costs in defending itself, “[t]he expense and annoyance of litigation is ‘part
of the social burden of living under government’”) (quoting Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 304 U.S.
209, 222 (1938))).
87. See Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768, 773.
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IV. Analysis
A. The Exhaustion Doctrine
In general, a defendant must exhaust all available administrative remedies
before seeking judicial review.88 The exhaustion doctrine “is as old as federal
administrative law”89 and was initially created for the purpose of “orderly
procedure” and to decrease the wasteful caseload in Article III courts.90 The
doctrine is recognized as “the long settled rule of judicial administration that no
one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.”91 Section 704 of the APA
(“section 704”) explicitly states that “agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”92 In 1993,
the Supreme Court affirmed that under this section, after “an aggrieved party has
exhausted all administrative remedies expressly prescribed by statute of agency
rule, the agency action is” considered final and subsequently may undergo judicial
review by Article III courts.93 The exhaustion doctrine was intended “to allow an
administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence—to
make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to
moot judicial controversies.”94 For the most part, exhausting administrative
remedies is, “required as matter of preventing premature interference with agency
processes, so that agency may function efficiently and . . . to compile record which
is adequate for judicial review.”95
However, the exhaustion doctrine is not dispositive in all cases. Instead, the
decision to order the exhaustion of administrative remedies is “within [the] sound
discretion of court.”96 In other words, there are a few exceptions to exhausting
administrative remedies, including without limitation: “when [an] agency has
clearly violated constitutional rights of party seeking injunctive relief against
administrative proceeding”;97 “when administrative remedies are inadequate”;98
when the “issue involved is strictly legal one not involving agency’s expertise or
any factual determinations”;99 when “exhaustion would . . . be futile or where

88. See Raoul Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981, 981 (1939).
89. Id.
90. See id. at 983, 984 (“Emphasis upon orderly procedure serves to preserve the advantages of a ‘preliminary sifting
process’ by a tribunal specially equipped to deal with problems that are often of great technical complexity.”).
91. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938).
92. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1966).
93. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146 (1993).
94. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) (citing McKart v. U.S., 395 U.S. 185, 194–95 (1969)); see also U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Notestine, 857 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the APA “does not allow judicial usurpation of
powers granted to an agency” but it does “permit[] judicial review only of final agency actions” because exhausting
administrative remedies helps “(1) to avoid premature interruption of the administrative process; (2) to let the agency
develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based; (3) to permit the agency to exercise its
discretion or apply its expertise; (4) to improve the efficiency of the administrative process; (5) to conserve scarce judicial
resources . . . ; (6) to give the agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors; and (7) to avoid the . . . ‘weaken[ing of]
the effectiveness of an agency . . .’”).
95. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975).
96. NLRB v. Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 429 n.8 (1968).
97. Blue Ribbon Quality Meats, Inc. v. FTC, 434 F. Supp. 159, 163 n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (citing Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d
720 (2d Cir. 1949)).
98. Indus. Union, 391 U.S. at 429 n.8 (citing Greene v. U.S., 376 U.S. 149 (1964)).
99. Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 495 F.2d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing Jewel Cos., Inc. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th
Cir. 1970)).
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irreparable damage is likely to occur in [the] meantime”;100 and when agency
inaction or delay would cause prejudice to the claimant.101
Yet, there is another exception to this exception: “an allegation of
unconstitutionality without more has been held insufficient to invoke . . . relie[f]
from the exhaustion requirement.”102 It has even been observed that “[t]he
requirements of orderly procedure . . . triumphed over the argument of ultra vires
in cases which were alleged to lie outside the administrative jurisdiction of the
subject matter.”103 Thus, at times, following the orderly process of administrative
review may preempt federal jurisdiction, even if the case involves a constitutional
question.104 Moreover, if Congress created a scheme in its statute that “all
constitutional claims must be funneled through the direct-appeal process after a
final agency action[,]” district courts cannot take it upon themselves to review the
case despite the federal question raised.105
To determine whether Congress intended to provide a certain route of
review, the statute’s “text, structure, and purpose” must be analyzed.106 According
to section 78y(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress gives a
defendant the right to “obtain review of the [final order of the Commission] in the
United States Court of Appeal for the circuit in which he resides or has his
principal place of business, or for the District of Columbia Circuit, by filing [a
written petition] in such court, within sixty days after the entry of the
order . . . .”107 From the plain language alone, it is “fairly discernible” that Congress
intended the SEC to implement a final decision prior to the defendant seeking
judicial review in a federal forum, and that Congress also intended that the
defendant “proceed exclusively through the statutory review scheme established
by [section] 78y because that scheme provides for meaningful judicial review” in
either the circuit court of appeals of the defendant’s jurisdiction, or the District of
Columbia Circuit.108 The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is to grant the SEC broad
prosecutorial powers, and to establish a system of administrative exhaustion prior
to reaching federal forum.109 There is no evidence that can be found from the “text,
structure, and purpose” of section 78y or the Dodd-Frank Act110 that would suggest
that a defendant is allowed to “challeng[e] the constitutionality of . . . the

100.

Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1971) (citing Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. U.S., 355 U.S. 534 (1958));

see McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992) (“[A]n administrative remedy may be inadequate where the
administrative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it.”); see also White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 675, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that futility may occur when there is “undisputed bias
which would render pursuit of an administrative remedy futile”).
101. NLRB v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 20 F.3d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The deference usually accorded to a governmental
agency is inappropriate where . . . such inordinate delay has occurred.”).
102. Berger, supra note 88, at 996.
103. Id. at 999.
104. See id. (explaining that in Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco, Ry., 274 U.S. 588, 595 (1927), Justice Brandeis
“insist[ed] on the exhaustion requirement although the constitutionality of a state act was in question”); see also id. n.94
(“Whether the Act is valid, is not for the moment so important as the fact that an adequate and orderly method is available
for the determination of this question outside the equity powers of the court” (quoting Clark v. Lindemann & Hoverson Co.,
88 F.2d 59, 60 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937))).
105. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 776 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Doe v. FAA, 432 F.3d 1259, 1262-63 (11th Cir.
2005)).
106. Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (2012).
107. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (emphasis added).
108. Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 774 (7th Cir. 2015).
109. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h) (2010)
110. See generally id. (explaining that after a final decision is made, action can be brought to district court); see
generally id. § 5563(b)(4) (explaining the appeal to the appellate court process).
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structural authority of the SEC” in the midst of their ongoing administrative
proceedings.111
Furthermore, it would be a mistake for courts to automatically assume that
SEC defendants are free to raise a constitutional claim prior to final agency action
based on Free Enterprise Fund’s holding. Free Enterprise Fund is distinguished
from the situation at hand because the district court had jurisdiction over
petitioners’ constitutional claim challenging the “dual for-cause limitations on the
removal of Board members” prior to final agency action.112 This is crucial because
“[s]ection 78y provides only for judicial review of [SEC] action” after final
Commission action, but does not provide that every Board action “is encapsulated
in a final Commission order or rule.”113 Because this case involved Board action,
and not Commission action, section 78y would not apply,114 and thus, the
petitioner here was free to bring a constitutional claim to an Article III court before
exhausting administrative remedies. For specific claims regarding Board action,
the exhaustion doctrine would not apply, unless the statute explicitly stated
otherwise. This easily overlooked but important detail is the reason why the
Supreme Court allowed judicial review at the stage prior to the administrative
Board proceeding.115 Thus, Free Enterprise has no bearing on section 78y
proceedings.
Even if SEC defendants’ analysis of the Appointments Clause has merit,
they still have to follow the process of administrative review as prescribed by
section 78y. It is ultimately up to the Legislature, and not the courts, to change
the statute’s process of administrative review. Until then, section 78y is intended
to provide a route of agency review before claims reach federal jurisdiction.
Otherwise, SEC defendants would consistently “‘jump the gun’ by going directly
to the district court to develop their case,” which “would create substantial
uncertainty about what sort of claims could properly be adjudicated outside the
administrative scheme.”116 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that this was not Congress’s intent.117
B. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and the
Administrative Process
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 initially created the SEC “[t]o provide
for the regulation of securities exchanges and . . . to prevent inequitable and unfair
practices on such exchanges and markets”118 in reaction to the Great Depression

111. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 775; see 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (stating that “[a] person aggrieved by a final order of the
Commission . . . may obtain review of the order” in an Article III court) (emphasis added); see 12 U.S.C. § 5382 (2010)
(“[T]he United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have jurisdiction of an appeal of a final
decision of the Court filed by the Secretary . . . .”) (emphasis added).
112. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489, 490, 491–92 (2010).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Congress intended that section 78y only covers final Commission orders. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (“Final
Commission orders”).
115. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477 at 487, 490; see infra note 193 and accompanying text.
116. Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
117. See id.
118. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, § 2, 48 Stat. 881; see id. § 4(a) (“There is hereby
established a Securities and Exchange Commission . . . to be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
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of 1929.119 Since then, the Dodd-Frank Act further expanded the SEC’s power to
respond to the 2008 financial crisis.120 The intent of the Dodd-Frank Act is “[t]o
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices,”121 among other purposes. In order to effectively
enforce regulations, monitor businesses, and prevent yet another potential fiscal
collapse, Congress established the SEC’s broad powers, specifically granting
rulemaking and prosecutorial authority to the SEC.122
The Dodd-Frank Act gives the SEC full discretionary authority to prosecute
registered companies as well as unregistered individuals and companies through
administrative proceedings.123 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC was able to
seek civil penalties against unregistered individuals only in federal court. 124 Now,
the Dodd-Frank Act gives the SEC the discretion to choose either a federal court
forum or an administrative forum to pursue its enforcement actions.125 This type
of policy with “special review procedure” was purposefully created in order to
maintain consistency and to avoid duplication in securities regulation claims.126
The Chief Administrative Law Judge can either preside over the matter or
may delegate an independent ALJ127 to preside and issue an initial decision.128
Respondents may appeal the initial decision to the SEC Commissioners, and if
they lose again, they are free to petition their claims for review to the federal court
of appeals.129 Otherwise, if the issue is uncontested by either party, the SEC will

119. SEC, THE INVESTOR’S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND
FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION (June 10, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (explaining that “[w]hen the
stock market crashed in October 1929,” the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “which created
the SEC, was designed to restore investor confidence in our capital markets by providing investors and the markets with
more reliable information and clear rules of honest dealing”).
120. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2010); see generally Marilyn
Geewax, Did The Great Recession Bring Back The 1930s? , NPR (July 11, 2012, 11:52 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/155991507/did-the-great-recession-bring-back-the-1930s; David M. Edwards, How Does
The Current Economic Recession Compare To The Great Depression?, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2011, 10:54 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2011/11/08/how-does-the-current-economic-recession-compare-to-the-greatdepression/#600be3467597.
121. 12 U.S.C. § 5301.
122. SEC, FAST ANSWERS (April 6, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/answers/rulemaking.htm (defining the SEC’s rulemaking
authority to include “updat[ing] rules under existing laws, or to create new rules within existing authority that the agency
believes are needed”).
123. See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1301–02 (N.D. Ga. 2015); see also Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u-1, 78u-2, 78u-3.
124. See Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1301–02.
125. Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Section 929P(a) of Dodd-Frank . . . [gave] the SEC a choice of
forums: . . . proceed in federal district court or conduct its own administrative enforcement proceeding.”); see generally
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 929P(a)-(b) (2010)
(for the “Strengthening Enforcement by the Commission” section); see also Robert Anello, Administrative “Home Court”
Advantage
in
Enforcement
Proceedings,
FORBES
(Sept.
7,
2015,
4:40
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/09/07/addressing-the-secs-administrative-home-court-advantage-in-enforcementproceedings/#61fdc27154ea (“In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act provided the SEC with the option of pursuing internal
administrative proceedings in lieu of filing an action in federal court.”).
126. Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
127. See SEC, How Investigations Work, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015, 3:27 PM); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1302–03; see 17 C.F.R. § 201.110.
128. See Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1302–03.
129. See id. at 1303; Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767 (“If aggrieved by the SEC’s final decision, [the accused] will be able to raise
her constitutional claims in [a federal] circuit or in the D.C. Circuit.”); see 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(c); Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).
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accept and set in stone the ALJ’s initial decision as a final decision.130 Ultimately,
“[a] decision is not final until the SEC issues it.”131
Congress created the SEC in order to enforce its stringent laws in the
securities market. Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the SEC did not have
the authority to regulate unregistered individuals in administrative proceedings,
but now, Congress specifically allows the SEC to do so. In allowing SEC
defendants to derail their case and bypass the exhaustion doctrine ensures that
the agency will not do its job of effective enforcement when it was originally
created to do so, and will further frustrate congressional intent.
C. SEC Administrative Law Judges Are Not “Inferior Officers”: How Are They
Appointed and What Are Their Responsibilities?
The APA created the position of the ALJ.132 “SEC ALJs are ‘not appointed
by the President, the Courts, or the [SEC] Commissioners. Instead, they are hired
by the SEC’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief
Administrative Law Judge, human resource functions, and the Office of Personnel
Management’ (“OPM”).”133 Although “[f]ederal ALJs remain under the . . . control
of their hiring agency,”134 SEC ALJs are still “independent of the [SEC].”135
Under the authority prescribed by the APA136 and federal securities law,137
an ALJ has the authority to:
(1) Administer oaths and affirmations; (2) Issue subpoenas; (3) Rule on offers of
proof; (4) Examine witnesses; (5) Regulate the course of a hearing; (6) Hold pretrial conferences; (7) Rule upon motions; and (8) Unless waived by the parties,
prepare an initial decision containing the conclusions as to the factual and legal
issues presented, and issue an appropriate order.138

The SEC has the discretion to decide whether or not to approve the ALJ’s initial
decision in order for it to become a final rendering,139 since ALJs function as mere

130. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1303; see also SEC, Office of Administrative Law Judges, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/alj
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015, 2:54 PM) (describing general procedures of an ALJ).
131. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1303; see also Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 766–67 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that after
an ALJ issues an initial decision, the SEC may either “adopt the ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision of the agency or
. . . grant [Bebo’s] petition [for review with the SEC] and conduct de novo review. If the SEC’s final decision is adverse, Bebo
will then have the right under 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) to seek judicial review” in a federal forum).
132. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404 (1946), 60 Stat. 237.
133. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2015); see generally Classifications & Qualifications, OPM.GOV,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifications/general-schedule-qualification-standards/specialt
y-areas/administrative-law-judge-positions/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2015, 2:10 PM) (describing qualification standards for
ALJs); see also Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in
Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 443 (1999) (“Although agencies have the primary
responsibility for their ALJs, the Office of Personnel Management has some role in the hiring and retention of ALJs.”); see
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1305, 3344, 5372 (1994) (explaining the Office of Personnel Management’s role
in the process of appointing and compensating ALJs).
134. Bybee, supra note 133, at 444.
135. SEC, HOW INVESTIGATIONS WORK (May 24, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/
1356125787012.
136. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59.
137. Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77u, 78d, 78d-1.
138. 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14(a)(1)-(a)(8) (1995); see also SEC, Office of Administrative Law Judges, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/alj (last visited Nov. 21, 2015, 2:54 PM).
139. See Office of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 130 (“An initial decision becomes final when the Commission
enters a finality order.”).
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advisory roles to the Commission.140 Ultimately, SEC ALJs are employees and not
Inferior Officers because they do not exercise significant discretion or authority.
At first glance, it appears that an ALJ has extensive responsibilities similar
to that of an Inferior Officer. Buckley holds that Inferior Officers “exercis[e]
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States[,]”141 and thus, the
issue to resolve is whether an ALJ exercises significant authority. As mentioned
previously in Freytag, although the Chief Judge of the Tax Court had final
decision-making powers,142 an STJ was still considered an Inferior Officer because
he or she was allowed to “take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility
of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.”143
Because an STJ is considered an Inferior Officer with respect to certain duties, his
or her “appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause[,]” 144 but, the
Court still recognizes that STJs are “mere employees with respect to other
responsibilities.”145 The distinguishing factor between an ALJ and an STJ is one
of discretionary degree: an ALJ needs permission by way of order “from a federal
district court to compel compliance,” whereas an STJ can actually “enforce
compliance with discovery orders” and subpoenas without receiving an order from
a federal district court.146 This factor is critical because an ALJ cannot simply
compel orders with unfettered discretion like an STJ can, but rather, an ALJ must
get permission from an Article III court. An ALJ acts as a mere fact-finder and
investigator, as opposed to an STJ who may “exercise significant discretion” by
enforcing orders,147 and who may have “power of final decision in certain classes
of cases.”148 Conclusively, ALJs cannot be “Inferior Officers” because under
Buckley and Freytag, they must “exercise significant discretion” in order to attain
that status.149
Another case that addresses a similar constitutional issue is Landry v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.150 In this case, after the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) assigns a matter to an ALJ to preside over a
formal hearing, the FDIC’s Board of Directors can choose whether or not to adopt
the ALJ’s recommendation in order to issue a final order.151 Landry argued against
the constitutionality of the FDIC’s appointment process of ALJs, claiming that the
process violates the Appointments Clause.152 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that like the SEC, the FDIC Board of Directors are the only ones
with authority to issue a final decision.153 Therefore, since the FDIC ALJs cannot
140. Clark, supra note 7, at 83 (“Where the hearing examiner (or other officer where permitted by the subsection)
makes a recommended decision, the agency must always make an ‘initial’ or final decision. In making its decision, whether
following an initial or recommended decision, the agency is in no way bound by the decision of its subordinate officer; it
retains complete freedom of decision – as though it had heard the evidence itself. This follows from the fact that a
recommended decision is advisory in nature.”).
141. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
142. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 874 (1991).
143. Id. at 881–82 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 881.
145. Id. at 882.
146. Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (“Upon application of the Commission the district courts . . . shall
have jurisdiction to issue . . . injunctions[] and orders commanding (1) any person to comply with the provision of this title
[15 U.SC. §§ 78a et seq.], the rules, regulations, and orders thereunder . . . .”). Contra Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.
147. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.
148. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882).
149. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
150. 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
151. See Landry, 204 F.3d at 1128.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 1133.
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render final decisions, they are not Inferior Officers, but rather mere employees.154
The authority to issue final orders seemed to be the dispositive factor in the court’s
holding.
In Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, the Supreme Court
dealt with Federal Trial Examiners and individual trial examiners, who “had been
appointed pursuant to [section] 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act.”155 Due to
the increasing “volume of business,” agency heads, United States Service
Commission members, and National Labor Relations Board members often did not
preside over evidentiary hearings.156 To alleviate the heavy caseload of this “quasijudicial” agency, the Commission “designated hearing or trial examiners to preside
over [evidentiary] hearings[,]” who subsequently “made a report to the agency
setting forth proposed findings of fact and recommended action.”157 Authorized by
section 11 of the APA, the Civil Service Commission, much like the SEC, was
“authorized to make investigations, require reports by agencies, issue reports . . . ,
promulgate rules, appoint such advisory committees as may be deemed
necessary, . . . subpoena witnesses or records . . . .”158 Section 11 also established
that examiners, like SEC ALJs, can only be removed by the agency for “good
cause”.159
Yet, despite the hefty responsibilities these trial examiners may have had
while presiding over evidentiary hearings, the Court still held that because
“Congress intended to make hearing examiners ‘a special class of semiindependent subordinate hearing officers’ by vesting control of their
compensation, promotion and tenure in the Civil Service Commission[,]” the
examiners were found to serve more of an advisory and fact-finding role for the
Commission, and not a role that had significant discretion.160 Similar to an ALJ’s
lack of lifetime tenure, Congress also did not intend to include lifetime
employment for hearing examiners.161 The Supreme Court further held that a
hearing examiner’s position “is not a constitutionally protected position” because
not only is it a congressionally-created position, but examiners also do not have a
vested right in these positions since Congress may regulate them.162
154. See id. at 1134.
155. Ramspect v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 129 (1953); see generally Administrative Procedure
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 11 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006)),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/05/01/act-pl79-404.pdf (describing the Examiners position).
156. Ramspect, 345 U.S. at 130.
157. Id. at 131.
158. Id. at 133 (quoting § 11 of the original Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006)).
159. Id. at 132; see 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (“An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed under
section 3105 of this title [5 U.S.C. § 3105] by the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed only for good
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before
the Board.”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 542 (2010) (reaffirming 5 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)-(b)’s principle of establishing removal for good cause); see Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Faces Challenges Over the
Constitutionality of Some of Its Court Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:58 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faces-challenges-over-the-constitutionality-of-some-of-its-court-poceedings/
?_r=0 (explaining that under the APA, an agency can remove its ALJs “only for good cause”).
160. Ramspect, 345 U.S. at 143.
161. See id.; see Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 912 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that judges in Article
I courts, like the Tax Court, do not have life tenure); see Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor and Judge, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 4, 2014, 7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge-1407195362 (“[T]he
[APA] established today’s system of quasi-judicial tribunals overseen by [ALJs]. But these tribunals are not courts, and the
administrative law judges are not life-tenured judicial officers appointed under Article III of the Constitution.”); see Judith
Resnik, Judicial Independent and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 660 (1999) (“The
congressional authorization over this century of these new federal . . . ALJs . . . has been challenged by litigants arguing
their ‘right’ to an Article III judge who enjoys life tenure and a guaranteed salary.”).
162. See Ramspect, 345 U.S. at 133.
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There is evidence in the APA that Congress never intended ALJs to be
considered more than simply “Civil Service employees” nor ever intended their
statuses be elevated “above that of the investigative and prosecution personnel of
the agency.”163 In comparison, SEC ALJs’ roles are similar to that of the examiners
because they both preside over evidentiary hearings and provide
recommendations and reports of facts to the SEC to support the SEC’s final
decision.164 Additionally, like the Civil Service Commission, promulgated by
statute, the Office of Personnel Management approves compensation for ALJs.165
The APA’s good-cause protection provision166 was considered constitutional
for sixty-four years until Free Enterprise Fund’s decision in 2010.167 But, even the
majority in that case recognized that its holding is inapplicable to ALJs because
“unlike members of the Board, many administrative law judges . . . perform
adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions.”168 The
President’s removal power only concerns executive officers, like Board members,
and not ALJs because ALJs serve “purely recommendatory powers.”169
Moreover, the SEC is a “quasi-judicial” regulatory agency170 and “the power
of SEC ALJs is ‘quasi judicial.’”171 Pursuant to Humphrey’s Executor, “quasijudicial” agencies “must be free from executive control.”172 Thus, taken together,
ALJs’ adjudicatory function makes them “beyond the reach of presidential removal
power” unlike Board members,173 who perform purely executive functions. In
conclusion, SEC ALJs are not “Inferior Officers” according to Article II of the
Constitution, and thus, their “appointment” is constitutional.
To recap, SEC ALJs are neither Principal Officers nor Inferior Officers
because they do not have significant authority. Additionally, they do not have
tenure like an Article III judge, and they do not have final discretion over their
decisions. Only the SEC Commissioner has the final say. Furthermore, the SEC

163. Brief for the Appellant at 27-28, Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 15-12831),
https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/sec-11th-circuit-appeal-brief-in-hill-v-sec.pdf (“[I]n enacting the APA,
Congress envisioned that an ALJ’s ‘initial decision’ would be ‘advisory in nature’ and would merely ‘sharpen[] . . . the issues
for subsequent proceedings.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act 83-84 (1947))).
164. Hearing Examiners are now ALJs. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 11 (1946)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006)).
165. See Pay & Leave, OPM, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-administration/factsheets/administrative-law-judge-pay-system/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (describing ALJ pay system facts); see generally 5
U.S.C. § 5372 (1999) (describing basic pay levels for ALJs).
166. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 11 (1946),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/05/01/act-pl79-404.pdf (“Examiners shall be removable by the
agency in which they are employed only for good cause established.”). Now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006) (“An action
may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed . . . in which the administrative law judge is employed only
for good cause established.”).
167. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 402.
168. Id. at 412; see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 592 n.10 (2010) (“[O]ur
holding also does not address that subset of independent agency employees who serve as administrative law judges.”).
169. Nelson, supra note 4, at 413 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 490
(2010)); see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 592 n.10.
170. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), USLEGAL, http://system.uslegal.com/administrativeagencies/securities-and-exchange-commission-sec/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2016, 2:41 PM).
171. Richard F. Albert, Duka v. SEC Redux – SEC Holds Home Court Advantage for Another Round, FORBES (April
23, 2015, 9:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/04/23/duka-v-sec-redux-sec-holds-home-court-advantage-foranother-round/#646999ee237e; see generally Noah Feldman, SEC’s New Enforcement Powers Aren’t Going Away,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2015, 11:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/04/23/duka-v-sec-redux-sec-holds-homecourt-advantage-for-another-round/#646999ee237e (describing SEC ALJs as “quasi-independent” because “[t]hey work for
an agency, but are supposed to exercise judgment independent of agency prosecutors”).
172. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
173. Nelson, supra note 4, at 412.
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is considered an independent agency because it performs “quasi-legislative” and
“quasi-judicial” functions, which must be free from executive control.
D. Meaningful Review, Wholly Collateral, and Agency Expertise: Federal Courts
Do Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over These Constitutional Claims At the
First Instance
Opponents of the SEC administrative process argue that there is “strong
policy reasons . . . for immediate federal court review” because after exhausting all
the administrative remedies, “judicial review would no longer be meaningful”
since “[a]ll the clients and [the] business will have already left, and the [defendant]
will have nothing left to fight for.”174 A possible remedy to the problem is to provide
an “[i]mmediate federal review on a case-by-case basis . . . .”175 However, that
would hardly solve the problem, and would, in fact, be contrary to the exhaustion
doctrine. As noted above, the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is orderly
procedure. By immediately referring every case to federal review after individuals
raise an irrelevant constitutional question, the federal courts would be flooded
with similar claims, which is the type of problem that the exhaustion doctrine tried
to prevent in the first place.
For SEC defendants to obtain federal jurisdiction, three factors are
considered: “if ‘a finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial
review’; if the suit is ‘wholly collateral to a statute’s review provisions’; and if the
claims are ‘outside the agency’s expertise.’”176 After taking these factors into
consideration, it is possible for SEC defendants to still seek meaningful judicial
review as prescribed by section 78y because section 78y does not explicitly restrict
federal jurisdiction from hearing these types of securities claims.177 “If the federal
court can later hear the case and later undo the effects of an unconstitutional
process, ‘meaningful judicial review’ will have occurred.” 178 The fact that
defendants have to undergo an alleged unconstitutional proceeding in the first
place is irrelevant so long as there is an offered route of judicial review.

1. Meaningful Review
There is no doubt that evaluating empirical data is important.179 This
recent trend of litigation fostered the growth of empirical studies examining the
success rates of litigants who have their day in district court in comparison to the
success rates of litigants who have their claims pursued in administrative court.
According to recent studies, the SEC won ninety percent of cases against
contesting defendants before its own judges from October 2010 to March 2015,
174. Ryan Jones, The Fight Over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings,
68 S.M.U. L. REV. 507, 523 (2015).
175. Id.
176. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489 (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1994)); see
also Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212–13 (“This Court previously has upheld district court jurisdiction over claims considered
‘wholly “collateral”’ to a statute’s review provisions and outside the agency’s expertise, discussing particularly where a
finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review.” (citations omitted)).
177. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489.
178. Jones, supra note 174.
179. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323,
323 (1989) (“The neglect of empirical work is a bad, increasingly worrisome thing for our scholarship and teaching . . . .”).
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which is relatively higher than the SEC’s sixty-nine percent success rate in federal
court during the same period.180 The studies also show that the SEC tends to bring
a majority of its claims to administrative court.181
The data is irrelevant, however, to the question of meaningful review.
Although defendants have to go through two steps of review by the SEC before
they can take their claims to federal court, they still nonetheless have an avenue
to pursue judicial review in a federal forum as prescribed by section 78y. 182 In
Elgin v. Department of Treasury, the Supreme Court held that if a statute
provides “review in the Federal Circuit, [in] an Article III court fully competent to
adjudicate petitioners’ [constitutional] claims,”183 then “meaningful judicial review
exist[s].”184 The law appears to be that as long as Congress prescribes a route of
federal judicial review, then presumably, meaningful review exists, and parties
must adhere to the prescribed process. It is up to the legislature, and not the
courts, to decide the process of administrative review and ensure a method of
judicial review.
District courts that have not granted review for defendants on their federal
question claims in the first instance have a good reason for doing so. Their
reasoning is policy based, in fear of setting a precedent for other SEC defendants
to attempt to derail administrative proceedings, and in fear of contradicting
congressional intent. For example, in Tilton v. Securities & Exchange
Commission, the New York district court dismissed Lynn Tilton’s argument that
forced litigation through unconstitutional administrative channels does not
provide meaningful review.185 Although Judge Ronnie Abrams acknowledged
Duka’s ruling (requiring plaintiffs to endure an unconstitutional proceeding may
be harmful), absent a compelling reason, he refused to apply Duka in Tilton’s
situation.186 Abrams recognized that “any arguably plausible claim in district
court that an administrative proceeding should be enjoined as unconstitutional
could confer jurisdiction and thus thwart Congress’s intent to the contrary.”187
Ultimately, the fact that claimants must wait before seeking judicial review does
not mean there is a lack of meaningful review. Moreover, there is a chance that
defendants may prevail at the conclusion of the administrative proceeding against
180. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803; Gretchen Morgenson, Crying Foul on Plans to
Expand
the
S.E.C.’s
In-House
Court
System,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
26,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/business/secs-in-house-justice-raises-questions.html?_r=0.
181. See id. (“The SEC brought more than four out of five of its enforcement actions as administrative proceedings,
rather than federal-court cases.”).
182. See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“[J]udicial review can only come from the courts of
appeal following the administrative proceeding and the SEC’s issuance of a final order in Plaintiff’s case.”)
183. 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2137 (2012).
184. Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015).
185. See id. at *11–29; e.g., id. at *15 (explaining that in Freytag, “the fact that the judicial review of the
constitutionality of those proceedings occurred after the administrative proceedings concluded did not render such review
meaningless” (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880-92 (1991))); Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 32 417, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (“Criminal defendants . . . cannot interrupt their prosecutions and trials to appeal . . . [but] must await conviction
and final judgment. Delaying judicial review does not violate [their] due process rights any more than requiring plaintiffs
to await final adjudication before the SEC would violate theirs.”); Bebo v. SEC, No. 15-C-3, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25660,
at *10 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2015) (“If the process is constitutionally defective, Bebo can obtain relief before the Commission,
if not the court of appeals . . . Until then, Bebo must ‘patiently await the denouement of proceedings within the Article II
branch.’”).
186. See Tilton, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *12, *15 (“This Court respectfully declines to adopt this reasoning.”);
see generally Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49474 (S.D.N.Y. April 15, 2015)).
187. Tilton, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *12, *15; see Chau, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 425 (“This Court’s jurisdiction is
not an escape hatch for litigants to delay or derail an administrative action when statutory channels of review are entirely
adequate.”).
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them, so it would be an unnecessary burden on the court system to file a federal
question claim in the midst of the administrative proceeding.188
The Tilton court also rejected the argument that requiring Tilton to go
through the administrative review process “would subject [her] to ‘significant and
irreparable injury’” such as financial harm and expenditure on such proceedings
because “the expense and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of
living under government.”189 As stated in Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft
Clothing Company, “[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable
cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.”190 If held otherwise, every litigant
would argue this claim, further burdening the court system with more frivolous
cases, and would eventually render the exhaustion doctrine moot. Furthermore,
the fact-finding capabilities of the ALJ and the SEC are considered adequate “for
meaningful judicial review.”191 As so, meaningful judicial review exists because
section 78y grants appeals to address constitutional arguments and other issues
that may arise, and ALJs have sufficient capacity to find facts.

2. Wholly Collateral
Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Reich explains that district courts have
“jurisdiction over claims considered ‘wholly “collateral”’ to a statute’s review
provisions . . . particularly where a finding of preclusion could foreclose all
meaningful judicial review.”192 Essentially, a determination as to whether these
types of constitutional claims “are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed
within”193 section 78y is necessary. If this is so, “the claim may be channeled
through the administrative process to guard against claim-splitting, which could
involve redundant analysis of overlapping issues of law and fact.” 194 However, if
this is not the case, and the claim “fall[s] outside the agency’s expertise” as well,
the claim then becomes “‘wholly collateral’ to the type of dispute the agency is
authorized to hear.”195
Here, the constitutional claims that particular SEC defendants are raising
are not “wholly collateral” to section 78y’s review provisions because although
these types of claims are unrelated to securities law, they are nonetheless raised
during the administrative action, thereby making the claims “wholly collateral” to
the administrative action. To continuously allow accused individuals to raise these
“wholly collateral” claims in the midst of agency proceedings would defeat
Congress’s purpose in attempting to enforce securities laws and regulations. From
the language and legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act, it is clear that the
legislature intended that these claims be reviewed within section 78y to guard
against claim splitting and redundancy. Otherwise, section 78y would not have a
prescribed method of review.
188. See Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.2d 9, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[S]hould Jarkesy prevail in his administrative proceeding,
his claims would never reach a court of appeals.”).
189. Tilton, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *18–19 (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 339 U.S. 232, 244
(1980)).
190. 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974).
191. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 773.
192. 510 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1994).
193. Id. at 212.
194. Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2142 (2012).
195. Id.
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In Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court concluded that “[p]etitioners’
general challenge to the [Public Company Accounting Oversight] Board is
‘collateral’ to any Commission orders or rules from which review might be
sought.”196 Since the challenge was unrelated to Commission orders or rules, the
challenge was “collateral to the administrative review scheme.”197 The main focus
is whether the Appointments Clause question that SEC defendants raise is related
to the SEC’s orders or rules. If unrelated, then the question is collateral. On the
other hand, Elgin held that if petitioners sought “the kinds of relief” consistently
afforded by the types of claims “regularly adjudicated” by the particular agency
within the statutory scheme, then these types of claims are not “wholly
collateral”.198
At first glance, it appears that SEC defendants have a chance at satisfying
this prong in obtaining federal jurisdiction. This particular claim challenging the
constitutionality of the ALJ’s position is unrelated to the securities infringement,
and hardly deals with SEC’s “orders or rules.”199 Since these types of constitutional
challenges are fairly recent, it is not really the types of claims “regularly
adjudicated” by the SEC.200
Nevertheless, the timing of the question becomes a crucial factor to the
District of Columbia Court of Appeal’s analysis as to whether or not these
constitutional claims are indeed “wholly collateral” to the SEC’s administrative
proceeding. If SEC defendants are raising these claims in the middle of the
administrative proceeding against them, then these claims are not “wholly
collateral” to the proceeding.201 For example, in Tilton, Tilton “raised these issues
as an affirmative defense [during] the administrative proceeding” so these issues
were not “collateral” to the SEC’s “orders or rules from which review might be
sought.” The ALJ and the SEC would eventually “rule on those claims and it will
be the [SEC]’s order that [Tilton] will appeal, if in fact it finds against” Tilton.202
Moreover, the Tilton court explained that Tilton’s challenge was not “wholly
collateral,” but was “rather intertwined” with the administrative proceeding.203
Tilton was already being reviewed, so her “challenge therefore flow[ed] from the
fact that [she was] the subject of the proceeding that [she sought] to enjoin.”204 To
hold otherwise would “defeat Congressional intent, as any litigant subject to an
administrative proceeding would be invited to escape agency adjudication by
fashioning an incidental constitutional challenge and claiming that it is wholly
collateral to the pending proceedings.”205 The fact that Tilton raised this
constitutional issue after administrative proceedings started strongly indicates
that this issue is merely an afterthought—a “Hail Mary” attempt to derail the
proceeding—and is not actually “wholly collateral” to the proceeding. If it was
196. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 490 (2010).
197. Tilton, No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *30–31 (S.D.N.Y June 30, 2015).
198. Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2139-40.
199. Tilton, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *31.
200. Id. at *32.
201. See id. at *32; Cf. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487, 490 (holding that petitioners’ constitutional question claims
were collateral to the administrative review scheme because petitioners pre-emptively sued raising these claims only after
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board started a formal investigation, and petitioners did not raise these
challenges during an administrative proceeding against them).
202. Tilton, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *32.
203. Id. at *33.
204. Id. at *32.
205. Id. at *34.

Vol. 4, Fall 2016

71

Global Markets Law Journal
truly collateral to the proceeding, Tilton, along with other defendants who raise
the same claim, would have raised this claim prior to the start of the proceeding.
It is worthy to note that even the Supreme Court has rejected Lynn Tilton’s
petition for certiorari to challenge the SEC’s use of inhouse ALJs.206
Another example is Jarkesy v. Securities & Exchange Commission, a case
in which the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Bebo’s line
of reasoning: SEC defendants must follow the statutory scheme provided before
seeking judicial review in a federal forum.207 Congress’s decision to grant the SEC
choice of forum powers does not enable these type of defendants “to collaterally
attack [administrative] proceedings in court,”208 especially in the midst of the
proceeding. These constitutional claims at issue are “inextricably intertwined with
the conduct of the very enforcement proceeding the statute grants the SEC the
power to institute and resolve as an initial matter.”209 The Jarkesy court
acknowledges the result might have been different had the claim been filed before
the administrative proceeding began.210 Again, the timing of the challenge is
essential to the court’s decision. Therefore, for defendants who file constitutional
claims in the midst of their administrative proceeding, their claims cannot be
considered “wholly collateral”.

3. Agency Expertise
Every constitutional question need not be brought before an Article III
court.211 The Supreme Court recognizes that although “adjudication of the
constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been through beyond
the jurisdiction of administrative agencies,”212 pursuing a constitutional claim in
federal jurisdiction is not necessarily mandatory, especially when a particular
“[c]ommission has addressed constitutional questions in previous enforcement
proceedings.”213 But, even though a commission has not previously reviewed
constitutional questions, the Supreme Court indicates that claimants can have
their claims meaningfully reviewed before a Court of Appeals.214 It is possible that
a commission may have no expertise in analyzing statutes other than the statutes
that directly affect its agency. Nonetheless, the commission can still function as
an appropriate body of government to review the claims at issue since “agency
expertise [could] be brought to bear on” the statutory questions at issue.215
The Hill line of reasoning when it comes to agency expertise is that Article
II claims do not “fall within the [SEC]’s expertise” because “the statutory questions
206. See Kevin McCoy, Turnaround Queen Lynn Tilton’s Petition is Denied by Supreme Court, USA TODAY (May 30,
2017, 12:35 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/05/30/supreme-court-denies-turnaround-queen-lynn-tiltonspetition-review/102308478/; Greg Stohr, Tilton Rejected by U.S. Supreme Court on SEC Fraud Complaint, BLOOMBERG
(May 30, 2017, 9:33 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-30/tilton-rejected-by-u-s-supreme-court-onsec-fraud-complaint; infra Part IV.D(2).
207. 803 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
208. James W. Kraus, SEC Continues To Fight Off Collateral Challenges To Administrative Proceedings In The Wake
Of Dodd-Frank, WHITE-COLLARED BLOG (Oct. 6, 2015, 7:51 AM), http://www.white-collared.com/blog/2015/10/6/seccontinues-to-fight-off-collateral-challenges-to-administ.html.
209. Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
210. See id.; see, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 at 487, 490; see supra
note 193 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
212. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994) (quoting Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974)).
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
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involved do not require technical considerations of agency policy” and are not the
type of claims that “the SEC ‘routinely considers.’”216 The Bebo court, on the other
hand, presents a stronger argument based on precedent cases, such as Elgin. First,
Elgin established that Bebo “cannot sue in district court under [section] 1331 [of
title 28] merely because her claims are facial constitutional challenges.”217 Second,
Elgin also recognized that federal court “jurisdiction does not turn on whether the
SEC has authority to hold [section] 929P(a) of Dodd-Frank unconstitutional, nor
does it hinge on whether Bebo’s constitutional challenges fall outside the agency’s
expertise.”218
The court in Tilton acknowledges that “even if the SEC lacked authority,
competence, or expertise to adjudicate . . . constitutional claims, because
meaningful review of those claims in an Article III court of appeals is available,
district court jurisdiction would still be precluded.”219 What is dispositive to the
court’s opinion is the fact that meaningful review in federal court is ultimately
available, and thus district courts lack jurisdiction, at least in the “first
instance.”220 Even so, adjudicating the constitutionality of statutes is generally not
within the purview of administrative agencies, but, as explained by Supreme
Court jurisprudence in Thunder Basin Coal, “[t]his rule is not mandatory.”221 In
Chau v. United States, the Southern District Court of New York recognizes that
at least initially, the SEC is not completely incompetent to hear constitutional
claims, such as equal protection claims, during agency hearings.222 In sum, federal
district courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over SEC defendants’
constitutional claims in the first instance because (1) section 78y offers meaningful
review; (2) the claims are not “wholly collateral” to their administrative
proceedings; and (3) agency expertise in constitutional matters is not mandatory.
E. The SEC Is an Independent Agency
An “independent agency” is defined as “[a] federal agency, commission, or
board that is not under the direction of the executive”223 as delegated by Congress.
As an exception to the President’s removal powers, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that Congress may create “independent agencies whose members
may be removed only for cause and that may restrict the power of [P]rincipal
[O]fficers, serving at the President’s pleasure, to remove certain inferiors.” 224
Although Congress created these independent regulatory agencies, they are still

216. Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1309–10 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
217. Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012)); see
Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2141 (“As a general matter, federal district courts have ‘original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, . . . [but,] Congress may remove certain claims from the general jurisdiction of the federal courts in
order to channel these claims into a system of statutory review. For example, in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term
Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000), we considered a clause providing that ‘no action . . . to recover on any claim’ arising under the
Medicare laws ‘shall be brought under section 1331 . . . of title 28.’”); see generally 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980) (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”).
218. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 773.
219. Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015).
220. Id.
221. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994).
222. See 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 435 (S.D.N.Y 2014).
223. Independent Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
224. Nelson, supra note 4, at 405–06.
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considered part of the executive branch.225 However, these agencies, including the
SEC, were created to “impose and enforce regulations free of political influence,”226
namely from the President’s agenda. The difference between independent agencies
and executive-branch agencies is that “[b]y design, independent agencies are
insulated from the plenary control of the President.”227 Justice Stephen Breyer,
Congress, and other legal scholars identify the SEC as an independent agency,228
meaning that the SEC is free from executive control.
Since independent agencies were created to be free from political influence,
their structures are also created to weaken the political effect.229 Independent
agencies usually have an organizational structure that includes three basic parts
to foster independence:
(1) an odd number of members, with no more than a bare majority from the same
political party . . . (2) serv[ing] fixed, staggered terms . . . that typically extend
beyond the four-year presidential term . . . [and] (3) typically possess a combination
of rulemaking, enforcement and adjudication powers and functions.230

One of the most “critical element[s] of independence is the protection—conferred
explicitly by statute or reasonably implied—against removal except ‘for cause.’”231
Humphrey’s Executor confirmed this “added . . . layer of constitutional protection
to the agencies’ existing structural protections from presidential control.”232 In
fact, it has been suggested that “[i]ndependent agencies are almost always defined
as agencies with a for-cause removal provision limiting the President’s power to
remove the agencies’ heads to cases of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in the office.’”233 In other words, the most important factor that makes agencies
independent is the lack of authority that the sitting president has in removing
members of independent agencies for any reason but for the above-listed
situations.234
As decided by Humphrey’s Executor, the purpose of the “for cause” removal
protection is to prevent a president from removing an official for political
225. Branches of Government, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government (last visited Feb. 24, 2016)
(explaining that the executive branch includes independent agencies).
226. Independent Regulatory Agency, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/2593 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2016).
227. Lisa S. Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600 (2010).
228. See Nelson, supra note 4 (noting that Justice Breyer in Free Enterprise Fund confirmed that the SEC is “an
already independent agency”); see Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation
of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1137 (2000) (explaining that in 1980, Congress listed sixteen
“independent agencies” in the Paperwork Reduction Act, including the Securities and Exchange Commission); see Breger
& Edles, supra note 228, app. at 1285 (2000) (recording the SEC in the “Independent Federal Agencies” section of the
appendix); see Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (listing the SEC as part of the definition of
“independent regulatory agency”).
229. Breger & Edles, supra note 228.
230. Id. at 1137–38; see also Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257,
260 (1988) (describing characteristics of independent agencies based on “three statutory arrangements: the bipartisan
appointment requirement; the fixed term requirement; and the requirement that removal be limited to express causes”).
231. Breger & Edles, supra note 228, at 1138.
232. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 769, 771 (2013) (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1935)).
233. Id. at 772; see also Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent? 4 (Ctr. for the Study of Democratic
Inst.’s, Vanderbuilt Law Sch., Working Paper No. 08-2013), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/research/CSDI_WP_082013.pdf (“[T]he definition of independent agency most commonly cited by federal courts comes from the description in
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which suggests that a truly independent agency is one that is headed by a multimember body whose members serve fixed terms and are protected from removal except for cause.”).
234. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 227, at 610 (distinguishing executive agencies from independent agencies:
“independent agencies are different in structure because the President lacks authority to remove their heads from office
except for cause. Thus, these agencies are independent in the sense that the President cannot fire their leaders for political
reasons, and consequently, cannot use this ultimate sanction to back up particular policy recommendations”).
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disagreements.235 Initially, President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to replace
a commissioner from the Federal Trade Commission with a member of his own
selection, notwithstanding the restriction of removal under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.236 However, the Supreme Court still upheld the removal
restriction by “relying on legislative history indicating that the agency was to be
separate from an existing department and not subject to the orders of the
President.”237 The Court also found that the position of the FTC commissioner,
having a “quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial” function, was an important and
dispositive factor because since the function was not entirely an “executive” one,
the FTC commissioner could be insulated from presidential removal.238
Another consideration is the distinction between independent agencies and
executive agencies. Even though independent agencies are part of the executive
branch, they are distinguished from executive agencies because executive agencies
are subject to the president’s authority to a greater extent than are independent
regulatory agencies.239 Aligned with the principle of Humphrey’s Executor,
“Presidents cannot (or at least do not) fully control independent agencies, and . . .
an independent agency therefore can be sufficiently adverse to a traditional
executive agency” to the point where the Supreme Court and the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals have both “entertained suits between an
independent agency and a traditional executive agency.”240 Independent agencies
not only seem to be “more insulated from the President” than traditional executive
agencies are, but they are also “more responsive to Congress.”241
The SEC defendants’ argument that ALJs were improperly appointed since
they are insulated from presidential control is further weakened by the fact that
the SEC is, in fact, an independent agency. Congress intended the SEC to be
independent, meaning that the President is essentially only dealing with
appointing the Commissioner. Everything else, including hiring ALJs, is for the
agency and the Office of Personnel Management to decide. Moreover, since the
SEC performs “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” functions, limitation of the
President’s power is permissible.242 It would be different if the SEC had strict
235. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 619, 625 (rejecting a removal based simply on the President’s disagreement with
an independent agency and not based on “good cause”).
236. See id. at 628 (quoting President Roosevelt’s letter asking for FTC commissioner to resign because “the aims and
purposes of the Administration with respect to the work of the Commission can be carried out most effectively with
personnel of my own selection”); see id. at 623 (explaining that the language of the Federal Trade Commission Act is
“definite and unambiguous” with respect to the president’s removal power only for inefficient, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in the office); see Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914) (“Any commissioner may be removed
by the President for inefficient, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”).
237. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 227, at 617.
238. Id.; Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629 (“The authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well be doubted.”).
But see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–76 (1925) (holding that presidents may not be restricted by Congress in
removing positions which exercise purely “executive” functions).
239. See SEC v. FLRA, 569 F.3d 990, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Independent agencies are
those agencies whose heads cannot be removed by the President except for cause and that therefore typically operate with
some (undefined) degree of substantive autonomy from the President . . . .”); see also Teresa Tritch, Is the I.R.S. an
Independent Agency?, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (May 14, 2013, 6:28 PM) http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/is-the-ir-s-an-independent-agency/?_r=0 (“One distinction between an executive agency and an independent agency is that the
president, typically, cannot dismiss the head of the latter without serious cause. Independent agencies include the [SEC,
NLRB, FCC, and the FTC].”).
240. FLRA, 569 F.3d at 997; see, e.g., Dep’t of Treasury v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922 (1990); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
241. Geoffrey P. Miller, Symposium: The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 218–19 (1988)
(“Authors . . . with practical experience in independent agencies testify that Congress exercises substantial influence over
the activities of these bodies.”).
242. Breger & Edles, supra note 228, at 1143.
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executive duties because then the SEC would be completely under the President’s
control, and thus, the hiring process of the ALJ would be subsequently
unconstitutional.243 Conversely, if independent agencies were subject to the
President’s every whim and control, there would hardly be a distinction and a
reason why two agencies, independent and traditional executive agencies, both
exist at the same time. All in all, it is the legislature’s duty to change the statute
if Congress desires for the SEC to be a purely traditional executive agency as
opposed to an independent agency.244 As Justice Stephen Breyer mentioned,
perhaps the president himself should be the one to raise this type of constitutional
challenge if he believes he is being improperly insulated from the ALJs.
V. Implications For the Future
If the final ruling of this issue were to follow Hill’s line of reasoning, there
would be consequences that would undercut the effective enforcement of securities
laws and regulations. Following Hill will not only turn effective and efficient
administrative proceedings into frivolous lawsuits that derail and delay
administrative proceedings, but it will also frustrate the congressional intent of
section 78y and the Dodd-Frank Act. If ALJs were to be removed at will, this
“would substantially undermine adjudicatory independence, leaving agencies free
to demand particular adjudicative results through the prospect of removing those
who did not get the ‘message,’” and consequently would have a “serious adverse
impact on the fairness of the administrative adjudicatory system.”245 Contrary to
Humphrey’s Executor, the President would also have too much control and
political influence over ALJs, who are supposedly independent from the SEC.
Likewise, this trend would surely encourage the accused to participate in “both
judge shopping and forum shopping.”246 Congress responded to the major problems
of fraudulent securities activities by giving the SEC certain powers through
section 78y, so courts should defer to legislative intent when deciding matters of
administrative procedure.247
Even if the SEC defendants have merit in their constitutional argument,
there is a simple fix to their problem. The SEC Commissioner can simply ratify
the appointments of the ALJs.248 Even the Hill court acknowledged this as a
243. Id.
244. Congress can simply get rid of the “good cause” removal provision.
245. Nelson, supra note 4, at 417–18.
246. Ben Conarck, SEC Wants Latest ALJ Case Taken Away From Georgia Judge, LAW360 (June 16, 2015, 5:44 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/668717/sec-wants-latest-alj-case-taken-away-from-georgia-judge; Jane Eaglesham, SEC
Fights Challenges to Its In-House Courts, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-fightschallenges-to-its-in-house-courts-1434927977#livefyre-comment.
247. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Why Challenges to SEC Admin Court
Will Likely Keep Failing, LAW360 (Mar. 6, 2015, 8:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/628601/why-challenges-to-secadmin-court-will-likely-keep-failing (“Defendants may not like it, but Congress gave the SEC and other agencies the power
to bring administrative claims knowing full well that the administrative court process differs from the federal court . . . .”;
“[T]he SEC is granted Chevron deference.”); see generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(granting deference to agency action).
248. See Order Denying Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., No. 9357
(Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150914labmdmotion.pdf (“Nonetheless, although we
conclude that the Appointments Clause does not apply to the hiring of Commission administrative law judges, the
Commission, purely as a matter of discretion, has ratified Judge Chappell’s appointment as a Federal Trade Commission
administrative law judge . . . .”); see also Alison Frankel, Unlike SEC, FTC Makes Quick fix to Ward off ALJ Constitutional
Challenge, REUTERS BLOG (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/09/16/unlike-sec-ftc-makes-quickfix-to-ward-off-alj-constitutional-challenges/ (“The [FTC] commissioners ratified the appointment of the LabMD in-house
judge to ward off ‘any possible claim that this administrative proceeding violates the Appointment Clause.’”).
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possible solution.249 Alternatively, the SEC Commissioners could “preside over the
matter themselves.”250 With that being said, both solutions would not affect
defendants’ substantive claims anyway. The SEC Commissioners could either
easily “prospectively ratify the [ALJ] appointments,” or could perform a simple “de
novo review of the determinations of the [ALJs to] correct[] any harmless error
from their appointment,”251 thus giving legitimacy to the result of the proceedings.
It would not make a difference to the present defendants’ constitutional claims.
Another solution could be to allow these defendants the choice of forum.
However, this solution is for Congress to decide. Moreover, defendants would
likely choose federal forums over administrative forums each time since
defendants are likelier to win in federal forums,252 further frustrating
congressional intent of effective enforcement. Thus, the best solution for now is to
preserve the status quo. In the meantime, courts should collectively defer to
congressional intent, follow precedent, and abide by the exhaustion doctrine when
confronting these particular types of claims.
VI. Conclusion
Defense attorneys have come up with a clever and creative way to attempt
to get their clients out of the SEC’s administrative proceeding against them: they
are utilizing Article II to reach federal jurisdiction where their clients will have a
better change at success. However, Supreme Court jurisprudence on Article II
indicates that ALJs are not likely to be considered “Inferior Officers” because they
do not exercise significant discretion, nor do they have lifetime tenure. The APA
stipulates that ALJs are “Civil Service employees,” and its legislative history
suggests that there is no intent for ALJs to be considered more than that.
Moreover, the SEC is an independent and “quasi-judicial” agency, and so, the “forcause” protection SEC ALJs receive is not only the consistent standard that other
agency ALJs typically receive,253 but also the President is rightfully insulated from
removing these “employees”.
But, even if defendants do raise a valid constitutional claim, district courts
do not have subject matter jurisdiction over these types of claims because (1) SEC
defendants can still obtain meaningful judicial review as prescribed by section 78y;
(2) these constitutional claims are not “wholly collateral” to the administrative
proceeding; and (3) SEC ALJs are not completely incompetent to hear
constitutional questions, at least in the first instance, so therefore, agency
expertise is not dispositive.
There is a strong public policy to abide by the exhaustion doctrine. If held
otherwise, the effective enforcement of the Dodd-Frank Act would be aggravated,
thus creating a serious adverse impact on the way the SEC can successfully
execute its goals. All in all, the “bottom line is that . . . Congress passed the statute

249. See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
250. Id.
251. Frankel, supra note 248.
252. See Eaglesham, supra note 180 (explaining that defendants have a 31% success rate in federal court as opposed
to 10% success rate in administrative court from October 2010 through March 2015).
253. See Russell-Kraft, supra note 247 (“If [defendants’ constitutional claims] worked, then a dozen agencies would be
arranged unconstitutionally.”).

Vol. 4, Fall 2016

77

Global Markets Law Journal
to give the SEC the authority to bring these cases administratively”254 and all
parties should abide by the law.

254.

Id.
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